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INTRODUCTION 
This appeal involves two issues. The first is whether the 
South Mountains of Mayflowerf s property were actively devoted to 
an agricultural after Gillmor stopped herding his animals there. 
If the South Mountains were used for agricultural purposes, then 
the second issue is whether grazing activity on all of the 
Mayflower properties satisfied the production requirements of the 
post-1993 Farmland Assessment Act. Since Mayflower has not proven 
agricultural use of the South Mountains, the Court need not address 
the production requirement issue. 
In defending the Tax Commission's decision in this appeal, the 
Tax Commission and Mayflower take significantly different 
approaches. Neither however relies simply on the approach 
suggested by the Tax Commission's findings below. This divergence 
of approaches, without more, raises questions about the soundness 
of the Tax Commission's finding of agricultural use in the South 
Mountains and of compliance with the post-1993 production 
requirements. 
A. Agricultural Use In The South Mountains. 
Mayflower's claim of agricultural use in the South Mountains 
is based on the testimony of Luke Gillmor, the herder on the 
property. According to Gillmor, he grazed his animals on all of 
Mayflower's property until approximately 1989. At that time, he 
stopped herding animals in the South Mountains because of the 
dangers posed by marauding dogs and encroaching development.1 Any 
animals that wandered into this areas were quickly recovered and 
returned to the safe grazing areas located east and north of the 
South Mountains. See Countyf s Opening Brief at 12-14 (detailed 
description of herding practices with appropriate reference to 
record). 
The only animal contact with the South Mountains occurred when 
a few animals would occasionally elude the herders and briefly 
wander on ground dangerously close to civilization. The record 
reflects no other animal contact with any portion of the South 
Mountains. 
Although animal contact with the South Mountains was 
accidental, unintentional and indeterminate, the Tax Commission 
found that the entire 1,495 acres of the South Mountains was 
"actively devoted to an agricultural purpose" and was "land used 
In its brief, the Tax Commission states: 
Denny Lytle, an agricultural economist with the 
Tax Commission testified that when dogs attach 
a herd of sheep "it's usually a bloody mess." 
(Tr./Lytle at 154.) The dogs, he testified, 
"usually go on a killing spree; they don't just 
kill one -- and eat it. They -- they'll go 
through and rip and slash and kill any number 
when they get going." (Tr./Lytle at 154. ) Mr. 
Lytle testified that the effect [of] this 
killing can be devastating to a livestock 
operation "[e]specially the sheep industry, 
with the lamb prices and the wool prices being 
as low as they are, you can't afford 
substantial predator losses. . . . " (Tr./Lytle 
at 154). 
Tax Commission Brief at 9-10. 
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for agricultural purposes," It however made no effort to explain 
how these contacts support a finding that the entire 1,495 acres 
of the South Mountains were used for agricultural purposes. It 
also made no attempt to reconcile its ruling to the plain meaning 
of the constitution and statute. 
Unlike its Decision below, the Tax Commission's primary 
position in this appeal is to urge the Court to create a 
"reasonable efforts" exception to the constitutional and statutory 
agricultural use requirement. Tax Commission Brief at p. 13. 
Implicit in this approach is recognition that actual agricultural 
use in the South Mountains stopped. 
For its part, Mayflower claims that Gillmor's decision to stop 
herding animals in the South Mountains is not a change in use 
justifying rollback tax. Mayflower Brief at 12. Mayflower also 
claims that grazing only stopped in the Bonanza Flats area, not the 
entire South Mountains. _Id. at 13. 
Neither the Tax Commission's nor Mayflower's claims are 
consistent with the constitution's and statute's language plainly 
requiring actual agricultural use, not merely efforts at use. 
Moreover, Mayflower's efforts to limit the area of non-grazing to 
the Bonanza Flats area is not supported by any evidence in the 
record, nor endorsed by the Tax Commission findings below or brief 
in this appeal. For these reasons, and as discussed more fully in 
this brief, the Court must reverse the Tax Commission's decision 
and enter judgment that no agricultural use occurred in the South 
Mountains. 
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B. Mayflower's Compliance With The Post-1993 Farmland 
Assessment Act's Production Requirements. 
If the South Mountains are actively devoted to an agricultural 
purpose, then the issue becomes whether Mayflower has proven that 
Gillmor's grazing used more than half the grazing capacity of the 
land. Mayflower however has not fulfilled this burden because it 
has failed to prove the capacity of the ground grazed. For this 
and other reasons, the Tax Commission findings of compliance must 
be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE SOUTH MOUNTAINS WERE NOT USED FOR 
AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES. 
The Tax Commission's findings establish that Gillmor no longer 
herded his animals in the South Mountains. Order ("Reconsideration 
Order") at p. 3 [R. 3A] ("Mr. Gillmor did attempt to keep them from 
the area because of the encroachment of civilization, including 
dogs which chase the animals."). Despite this fact, the Tax 
Commission found agricultural use because "some of the sheep and 
cattle may have wandered onto that property from other property, ff 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision 
("Decision") ir 16, p. 8 (emphasis supplied) [R. 91], and because 
"the animals did occasionally graze that area." Reconsideration 
Order at p. 3 (emphasis supplied) [R. 3A] 
As a matter of law, the Tax Commission's findings establish 
the absence of agricultural use in the South Mountains. 
Agricultural use under the Utah Constitution and the Farmland 
Assessment Act requires purposeful agricultural activity. 
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Agricultural use does' not exist when sheep or cattle, eluding their 
masters, occasionally wander on property. As a result, the Tax 
Commission finding of agricultural use in the South Mountains is 
erroneous as a matter of law, 
A. The Plain Meaning Of The Utah Constitution And The 
Farmland Assessment Act Requires More Than Unintended And 
Occasional Wandering of Unspecified Numbers Of Animals. 
To qualify for greenbelt protection, the Utah Constitution and 
the Farmland Assessment Act unambiguously require purposeful, 
rather than accidental, agricultural activity. Specifically, the 
Utah Constitution Article XIII § 3(2) permits the exemption for 
11
 [1]and used for agricultural purposes." This provision limits the 
Legislature's power to exempt agricultural property from a full 
fair market value assessment. Salt Lake County v. Tax Commission 
(Bell Mountain), 819 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1991). 
Consistent with the constitution, the Farmland Assessment Act 
makes agricultural use a prerequisite to greenbelt protection. In 
the pre-1993 Act, the Legislature extended the exemption to land 
"actively devoted to agricultural use." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-
503(1)(b) (pre-1993). In both the pre- and post-1993 versions of 
the Act, the Legislature provided that "[l]and in agricultural use" 
means "land devoted to the raising of useful plants and animals." 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-502(1)(a) (pre- & post-1993). 
The plain meaning of the Utah Constitution and the greenbelt 
statute require intentional action. The constitution's and 
statutes' critical terms are: "actively," "devoted," "use," 
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"agricultural," and "purpose."2 On their face, these terms require 
that the use, at minimum, be purposeful. 
Nothing in the record supports a finding of purposeful 
agricultural use. In fact, the Tax Commission's own findings make 
clear that the herder did not want the animals in the South 
Mountains and made every effort to keep them out of this area. 
Reconsideration Order at 3 [R. 3A] Some animals did occasionally 
evade the herders but were quickly retrieved. Such contacts 
however do not evidence purposeful agricultural use. 
Absent purposeful agricultural use, the Tax Commission's 
finding of agricultural use is erroneous as a matter of law. 
B. Agricultural Use On A Portion Of A Tract Cannot Bootstrap 
Non-Productive Areas Onto Greenbelt. 
In Salt Laket County v. Tax Commission (Bell Mountain), 819 
P.2d 776 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court made clear that the 
agricultural use of a small portion of a larger tract could not be 
used to bootstrap nonproductive areas into the greenbelt. _Id. at 
780. Nonproductive areas do not qualify for greenbelt unless they 
are "reasonably required for the purpose of maintaining the land 
actually devoted to production." _Id. at 779. 
The Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1977) defines: 
(1) "active" as "characterized by action rather than contemplation 
or speculation . . . expressing action as distinct from mere 
existence or state . . . marked by vigorous activity," (2) "devote" 
as "to give over (as to cause, use, or end) wholly or purposefully, 
<land devoted to agriculture>," (3) "use" as "the act or practice 
of employing something," (4) "purpose" as something set up as an 
object or end to be attained: INTENTION," and (5) "agriculture" as 
"the science or art of cultivation the soil, producing crops, and 
raising livestock." 
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The Utah Supreme Courtf s holding in Bell Mountain merely 
follows from the plain meaning of the constitution that only 
permits an exemption for "land used for agricultural purposes." 
Non-productive land, even if part of a larger productive tract of 
land, is not land used for agricultural purposes unless it somehow 
contributes to agricultural activity. In the instant case, the 
South Mountains did not contribute to the grazing activity since 
the herder tired to keep his animals off this land. 
C. An Abandoned, Historical Use Of The South Mountains As 
Part Of An "Agricultural Unit" Does Not Satisfy The 
Agricultural Use Requirement. 
The Tax Commission and Mayflower argue that the South 
Mountains and the other Mayflower property functioned as an 
agricultural unit, and must therefore be considered as a whole. 
Having created a unit, they then rely on evidence of grazing on 
areas other than the South Mountains as evidence of agricultural 
use on the South Mountains. Tax Commission Brief at 26. 
The Court should reject appellees' efforts to avoid proof of 
agricultural use in the South Mountains by relying on an 
agricultural unit. The Tax Commission and Mayflower no where 
explain how the South Mountains can be part of a functional 
agricultural unit when the herder tries to exclude the property 
from his operations. Moreover, the Utah cases make clear that 
operation as a "farming unit" does not satisfy the agricultural use 
requirement for property that is not actually used for agricultural 
purposes or that does not reasonably contribute to the agricultural 
land. Stated in the words of the Utah Supreme Court in Bell 
7 
Mountain, agricultural use of a smal1 portion of a larger tract 
cannot not be used to "bootstrap" nonproductive areas into the 
greenbelt. 
T
 ~ Bell Mountain, the Court referred to "unit farm" *™ a 
context that makes clear i " >u * f does not eliminate the need for 
actual : t- ; * 
Court expressly held that - .:. * ei,« the 
constitutional authorization : article 3'* section 3(2) and of the 
i mp1erne . • actual agri cu3 11 11: a 3 i Ise 
could be bootstrapped onto , »f agricultural property and 
thereby spread the preferential tax assessment to a wi de area," Id. 
a I: > 80 (emphasis supp3 i ed ) Tl m is t::I: le absei ice acti lal i lse pr ecludes 
greenbelt treatment. 
The Courtf s * i i ng was: 
This acreage is not reasonably required for the 
purpose of maintaining the land actually 
grazed, not does it in any way support activity 
oi i that land.. Under these circumstances, :i t 
cannot be successfully maintained that such 
acreage is in agricultural use. Furthermore, 
the seven separately described tracts were not 
ever part of a unit farm . . . . For all that 
appears in the record, the seven parcels may 
have been acquired by the taxpayer at different 
times and the only relationship between them 
is simply that they meet each other at one or 
more of their corners. We do not believe that 
it was the intent of the constitutional 
authorization in article 13, section 3(2) and 
of the implementing statues that tracts not in 
actual agricultural use could be bootstrapped 
onto a core of agricultural property and 
thereby spread the preferential tax assessment 
to a wide area. 
Id. at 7 79-80. 
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In Board of Equalization v. Utah State Tax Commission(Judd), 
846 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1993), the issue was whether the subdivided 
lots used for agricultural should be included with the farmer?s 
other land to meet the statute's 5-acre and production 
requirements. The issue was not whether the ground had in fact 
been used for agricultural purposes.4 
In addressing the 5-acre and production requirement, the Judd 
Court held that since the ground was being "farmed as a single 
agricultural unit," each of these requirements could be satisfied 
by looking at all the land that had been used as a unit. Judd, 
supra, 846 P.2d at 1296. The Court also noted that, even though 
portions of the land had changed owners, the farmer had regained 
possession, had fenced the entire acreage as one contiguous unit, 
and had treated as a "single agricultural unit." _Id. at 1296 n. 4. 
The Judd case is therefore different from the instant case where 
Gillmor no longer treated the South Mountains as part of the 
farming unit. 
The Tax Commission and Mayflower read too much into Bell 
Mountain and Judd. Stripped to its essence, appellees1 position 
is that, once property has been used as a unit, it remains a unit 
The farmer in Judd had received greenbelt on his land, 
but later sold a portion of the land to a developer. The developer 
installed curbs, gutters, and utilities and reconveyed to the 
farmer. The farmer sold some of the lots, but continued farming 
activity on the unsold lots. Among other things, the County argued 
that the subdivided property that was for sale as residential 
property could not be actively devoted to agricultural use. The 
Court rejected this contention because multiple use property 
qualified for greenbelt. Id. at 1296. 
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forever even if the farmer stops using the property as - t 
surprisingl'' i hn < •, ii ,<«s i ii i 11 t • iif IJ n > i i ,' tin 11 11 s e n s e l e s s r e s u l t . 
As Bell Mountain and Judd make clear, actual use as a uilit is 
required to qualify for greenbe]* ** abandoned, historical use is 
not sufficient \u ldiin) animals iij the South 
Mountains, these mountains cannot be part ol the farming unit. 
i1 ilia Agricultural Use Requirement Is Nni Satisfied. By A 
Herder's "Reasonable Efforts" T« Use The Land For 
Agricultural Purposes. 
The Tax Commission urges the Coin t to create a public policy 
exception to the agricultural use requirement for • sr 
"reasoi *' for agricultural purposes. Tax 
Commission Brief at 2'I. reasonable efforts" exception however 
has no basis in, and is inconsistent with, i ha pi mi a lanqiitnja UJ 
the, 111 .ill Cnastiiuil mi iiini ilic iKarmland Assessment Act. The Court 
should therefore refuse to recognize such an exception. 
The THX Commission offers the Faiinlanrl Assessment 'u.'t "' a 
Legiiil.r support its "reasonable efforts" exception. 
The Utah Supreme Court and this Court howevei have made 
unequivocall : 1 eai tha t I eq islnl iwi> a i a n 1 r y o r policy 
consi is r..i' . •/ come i nto play when the i I atutory language is 
ambiguous. In re Wort hen, 1996 WL 605216 p. IV (Utah, October 22, 
1996 ) . This i •-• particularly tin- »"'• •• • • J s * a i p i a 1 i i ly « ! ie Utah 
I'OIISI i I ml m n .iee Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P. 2d 844, 850 n. 14 
(Utah 1994). 
As shown above, the i<" r I M'. """ati Constitution 
«!inl I;ai in I riiui Assessment Act unambiguously require that the land be 
actually used for an agricultural purpose. Nothing in the 
constitution's or statue's language even remotely suggests that the 
use requirement can somehow be satisfied by unsuccessful, but 
"reasonable efforts" at agricultural use. The Tax Commission has 
shown and makes no effort to show ambiguity on this issue. 
In addition, the Tax Commission no where explains how the 
Legislature, regardless of the important public policy served, can 
create an exemption broader than authorized by the Utah 
Constitution. The constitution only permits special treatment for 
"land used for agricultural purpose." A "reasonable efforts" would 
unconstitutionally permit an exemption for property not in fact 
used for agricultural purposes as the constitution requires. 
The Court should disregard the Tax Commission's references to 
Legislative History or Public Policy as a basis for creating a 
"reasonable efforts" exception. Cf. Judd, supra, 846 P.2d at 1297 
(refusing to ignore plain language of Farmland Assessment Act 
notwithstanding Legislature's apparent, but unexpressed, policy 
goals). 
E. The Farmland Assessment Act Has Only One Standard For 
Determining The Existence Of Agricultural Use. 
Mayflower contends that the standard for determining 
agricultural use may different if the owner is trying to establish 
greenbelt status as opposed to maintaining it. Mayflower's Brief 
at 12. Mayflower however provides no basis for this supposed 
distinction nor does it state what the different standards would 
be. The Court should therefore reject this argument. 
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F. The Record Does Not Support The Tax Commission's Claim 
Of "Grazing" In The South Mountains. 
Commission characterizes the animal activity * the 
South Mountains as "grazing :i term "(ji a/ i mj il" US<M • - se 
it suggests agricultural activity lowever, the evidence does not 
support i he "i jraz i no" characterization. 
The record contains undisputed evi dence 1:1 1a t - •: xl mi tj c !: 
Park City, Deer Valley, and the State Park forced Giilmor to stop 
herdi :i lg 1 li s ai il ma I " 1l South Mountains. Dogs from these areas 
would attack Gillmoi .; herd destroying h i s sheep and his profit 
margin. Because of this, Giilmor stopped grazing the South 
andered there. 
i rl r . /Giilmor 22-^, 73-74. ^./Lytle ; •.. ) 5 
- i* • ** :.. Commission cites s cw< o* the same 
test_ ^ Tax commission tsrier * ~> 
to Tr./ Giilmor at 24-25, 41J, 65-66. Tt however characterizes this 
testimony as showing that "animals still grazed the area [South 
I !c i ii I t a I i i s ] "l1"1 • "' ' i l i 1 l e i iMiiil! In i i i i h i 1 1 ; i»t ' J i p e p FA\I I I q r . t z c M i I t i e 
area. " Tax Commission Brief at 26-27 Tl: : = Tax Commissioi • 
selected references however do evidence "grazing" in the South 
Mount a J ins In I In t.< , 'Rii-ei p i s
 (l (ii I I IIIU i lostii ied: •-' • '•' 
I Sheep that had gotten iii the South Mountains had 
"strayed off," had gotten there on their own, and had to 
be brought back. (Tr./Giilmor at 24-25). 
2. it was not "practical to use [the] South Mountains to any 
substantial amount" because of recreationers and dogs. 
(Tr./Giilmor at 4 2 ) . This portion of the transcript does 
The County's opening brief contains Giilmor fs testimony 
verbatim. County 1s Opening Brief at 26-33. 
12 
not refer to "grazing," nor describe the animals1 contact 
with the South Mountains. 
3. Developments in Park City and Deer Valley created problem 
with dogs. (Tr./Gillmor at 65-66). This portion of the 
transcript does not refer to "grazing," nor describe the 
animals' contact with the South Mountains. 
In light of the foregoing, the Tax Commission cannot fairly 
characterize the animal contact with the South Mountains as 
"grazing." 
G. Mayflower's Claim of Grazing On The South Mountain 
Canyons and Slopes Leading to Bonanza Flats Has No 
Support In The Record. 
Mayflower takes a different approach to the testimony on the 
South Mountains. It claims that the encroachment of civilization 
affected the grazing on only the Bonanza Flats1 portion of the 
South Mountains and that Gillmor continued to use the other areas 
of the South Mountains. Specifically, Mayflower claims that 
"slopes and canyons" leading to Bonanza Flats were grazed. 
Mayflower Brief at 4, 8, & 13. However Mayflower's citations to 
record do not support this contention. Mayflower Brief at 4, 8, & 
13 citing Tr./Gillmor at 22-27. 
Pertinent portions of Gillmorfs testimony on grazing in the 
South Mountains focus on Exhibit 2, a map of the Mayflower property 
before the condemnation and construction of the new US 40. A copy 
of this exhibit is attached to this brief. 
On this map, a blue shaded area is identified as "Mayflower 
Properties (other)." This blue shaded area is south and west of 
the density determination area and is referred to in this case as 
the "South Mountains." Included within the blue shaded area is 
13 
Bonanza Flats. (Tr./Gillmor at 23) 
Gillmoi '" s testimony about his inability to x ise the areas 
within the blue shaded area, the South Mountains, is unequivocal. 
Gillmor Testimony (Direct examination >. 23 1. i/ to 25 1. 1. 
o in the ordinary year, do you move the sheep up the 
mountain side towards Bonanza Flats? 
A We haven't been, for a number of years• 
Q And why 1 las that beei i t:t le case? 
A We n.-L... - ±ot of problems when we had the sheep up there 
with first of all, there's - - there's only one small 
spring on this blue area, that's not sufficient to water 
a large herd of sheep and the sheep have to go off, like 
at this Midway Reservoir or somewhere. And we had --it 
was hard to keep the sheep on there, and -- but more so, 
we had a lot of problems with wild -- or domestic dogs 
that were coming from Park City and attacking the sheep. 
Q Okay, 
A And then also, we, as time went on, from this State park, 
there's a lot of people up there and a lot of people use 
this property for recreation and it's — it's hard to 
graze the sheep in there when there's so many people just 
doing all sorts of different types of recreational 
activities. 
Q When did that, (inaudible) you've just described, the 
dogs, for example, or the people engaged in recreational 
activities, when did that become a serious interference 
with putting sheep in those areas? 
A Well, it was, right at the time when we had sheep iip 
there in the -- in the latter part of the "80's, and it's 
just -- it -- the last couple years that we actually had 
sheep camp up there and it became so we figured it was 
more problem than it was worth to try and graze on it. 
With the -- you know, with the whole herd. 
We still have stock that periodically have came up onto 
the -- came up these canyons, especially sheep, because 
sheep's natural tendency is to climb up and through all 
the years, we've periodically had to come up onto this 
blue area and bring back sheep that have strayed off and 
gone 
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Q Gone up on their own? 
A Yes, 
Gillmof Testimony (Direct examination) p. 31 1. 5 to 31 1. 13. 
Q Looking at the blue area on this map that we've described 
before, the more mountainous terrain extending up toward 
Bonanza Flat; do the cows use that property for grazing? 
A Very little. But cattle do sometimes climb up these 
canyons. 
Q What do you do when that happens? 
A Well, we usually get a phone call, like from Deer Valley 
and have to go — to go get them and drive them back, 
using those areas? 
Gillmor Testimony (Cross examination) p, 73 1. 16 to 74 1. 1. 
Q Okay. Thank you. I think your testimony was that on the 
west side across -- on the west; side across the Mayflower 
interchange, if you will, that the animals primarily 
stayed within the little bowl — or not — I shouldn't 
say little, but in - within that bowl that's right on the 
west side of the road; is that correct? Right around the 
mine area? 
A Up — by the confines where I've outlined it on the map, 
yes. 
Q Okay. You'll get some that will graze up, or higher, but 
you have to bring those back down into that area; is that 
correct? 
A Yes. 
Contrary to Mayflower's assertion, this testimony establishes that 
grazing ceased on the entire South Mountains, not just the Bonanza 
Flats area. 
The Tax Commission's findings also reflect that the entire 
South Mountains were effected by the encroachment of civilization. 
Specifically, it held that "there was significantly diminished use 
for the South Mountain area beginning in approximately 1989." 
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Reconsideration Order 
Decision or Reconsideration Order does i: : i t:..i Bonanza Flats 
area differently from 1:1ie remainder of the South Mountains, 
ASSUMING THAT THE SOUTH
 M 0 U N T A I N S S A T I S F I E D T H E AGRICULTURAL 
USE REQUIREMENT, MAYFLOWER HAS FAILED TO PROVE COMPLIANCE WITH 
THE PRODUCTION REQUIREMENTS OF THE POST-1993 FARMLAND 
ASSESSMENT ACT. 
If the South Mountains were used for an agricultural purpose, 
the issue becomes whether Mayflower proved compliance wit) the 
p i o c i u i i i n n r e < j n i i I M I H M I I i. <i! I I  i • p u 1 I P I '' I I1 a IMIIIII I  . nul l i \ ! - i ! j e s s m * l i r t . 
Under the Act Mayflower must first establish the productive 
capacity of all Mayflower property including r<* South Mountains, 
It must thi mi till: :ia t . ... ,OL-V .*., « ,*s t 50% of ti lat 
productive capacity. 
Mayflower failed to satisfy this burden with respect to either 
of t:l lese elenei I ts Ii I f a ::: I: 1:1 ie Tax G Dmmi ssi • ::)i I ' s x i :i ] :i i lg f i i id i i ig 
compliance with the production requirements incorrectly placed the 
burden on the County. 
'.:.<_ nmission's errors, in part, are the resul t o £ i ts 
unwillingness to correct its misunderstanding of the evidence on 
both capacity and usage. It compounded this error by I mplicitly 
ignoring the error and simply pressing head with a fla/ized analysis. 
As a result, the Tax Commission's findings concerning compliance 
are hopeless confused and do not contai n subsidiary findings 
sufficient to reveal the findings internal logic. 
Because of •h.• confusion, neither Mayflower nor the Tax 
i n I i in in I ( i m p I I1 i i n i "i i mi in in in i inn i , ! n a s f M l i mi in i i n 
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Commission's supposed analysis. Tax Commission Brief at 36-43; 
Mayflower Brief at 14-20. In fact, after trying to justify its 
ruling, the Tax Commission seeks to sustain its ruling by having 
this Court make a factual finding based on evidence and a theory 
not even mentioned in either its Decision or Reconsideration Order. 
Tax Commission Brief at 44-45. 
For all these reasons and as more fully discussed below, the 
Court must reverse the Tax Commission's finding of compliance with 
the production requirements of the post-1993 Act. 
A. Mayflower Has Not Filed A Cross-Appeal And Therefore 
Cannot Challenge The Tax Commission's Decision. 
In its decision, the Tax Commission held that compliance with 
the post-1993 production requirements would be determined by 
comparing AUM capacity with AUMs used. The Tax Commission found 
that the AUM capacity of the Mayflower property was Graze II, and 
that acres classified Graze II could sustain .63 animals a month. 
Mayflower has not filed a cross-appeal challenging these 
factual findings, nor has it attempted to marshall the evidence to 
show these findings are not supported by substantial evidence. See 
Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 896 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 
1995)(refusing to consider issues raised in untimely cross appeal). 
Mayflower thus cannot urge the Court to overturn these findings. 
B. Mayflower Cannot Challenge The Foundation For The Graze 
Classifications. 
Mayflower seeks to challenge the foundation for the graze 
classifications on the property grazed by Gillmor. Mayflower Brief 
at 16-17. Mayflower however did not object to this evidence when 
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it was offered and therefore cannot challenge its admission now. 
(Tr./Brugner at 321-22) Even if the challenge had been preserved, 
Mayflower could not raise it absent a timely filed cross-appeal. 
See Glezos, supra. 
C. The Tax Commission's Computation Of The Property's AUM 
Capacity Fails To Account For The Capacity Of All Acres 
Grazed. 
The Tax Commission's decision properly recognized the need to 
include all land grazed in computing AUM capacity. Decision at ir 
24, p. 10. This means that AUM capacity is based not only on the 
land owned by Mayflower but all land grazed regardless of 
ownership. Although recognizing this need, the Tax Commission 
failed to include all land grazed in its AUM computation and thus 
understates the AUM capacity. 
In the Tax Commission's lexicon, land in agricultural use 
includes all land where animals may have wandered despite the 
herder's best efforts. This means that the Mayflower property and 
the South Mountains are included, and that Gillmorfs property in 
Summit County is included. It also means that the Deer Valley ski 
area is included since Gillmor admitted that animals wandered 
there. It also means that the land on the west side of US 40 north 
of the Mayflower mine is included since Gillmor testified that 
animals wandered there. It also means that the land on the east 
side of US 40 between Mayflower's north and south parcels is 
included since Gillmor testified that animals wandered there. 
Having identified the land grazed, the next step is to compute 
the number of acres in the areas grazed. The record does contain 
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evidence of the acres within the Gillmor and Mayflower property. 
Mayflower however presented no evidence of the acreage of the other 
land where animals may have wandered. Without this information, 
it is not possible to compute AUM capacity on the land grazed. 
The Tax Commission's findings do not contain an understandable 
explanation of how the Tax Commission determined the number of 
acres grazed. See County's Opening Brief at p. 38-42, 44-47. In 
defending the finding, neither Mayflower nor the Tax Commission 
itself can explain the number of acres used. See Mayflower' s Brief 
at 21-22, Tax Commission's Brief at 36. 
In its brief on appeal, the Tax Commission's counsel provides 
an itemization of the total acres grazed. This acreage however is 
not the same as that found in the Tax Commission's own decision. 
More importantly, this itemization is limited to the acres "owned" 
by Mayflower and Gillmor and does not take into account the 
additional land that was not owned by either Gillmor or Mayflower 
but that Gillmor testified his animals went on. Without these 
additional acres, the Tax Commission's latest computation 
understates AUM capacity. 
Mayflower had the burden of proving the number of acres 
grazed. It however offered no evidence of the number of acres 
grazed other than those owned by Mayflower and Gillmor. Since 
these acres are necessary to establish AUM capacity, this failure 
of proof means that Mayflower did not proved its entitlement to 
greenbelt protection. 
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D* The Tax Commission Erroneously Put The Burden of Proof 
On The County. 
At trial, Gillmor identified his general grazing pattern in 
a peanut shaped outline. (Tr./Gillmor at 65, Ex. 109) This outline 
did not include the South Mountains. The County's expert 
determined the acres within this outline to be 4,714. (Tr./Wood at 
182-87, Ex 112c). 
The County's evidence was the only evidence of the number of 
acres grazed by Gillmor. The acreage relied on by Mayflower and 
the Tax Commission merely reflect acres owned, not the total acres 
grazed. If the County's evidence was defective, then there was no 
evidence of the number of acres grazed and Mayflower's proof 
failed. 
The Tax Commission however used this absence of proof as a 
basis for ruling against the County. It therefore improperly 
placed the burden of proof on the County. See County's Opening 
Brief at 35-36. 
E. The Parties Valuation Stipulation Did Not Establish The 
Number of Acres Grazed. 
During the formal hearing, the parties entered into a 
stipulation to resolve the issue of value. [R. 106] This 
stipulation determined the valuation and acreage size of 
Mayflower's property. The stipulation however did not identify the 
number of acres grazed by Gillmor, as opposed to owned by 
Mayflower. The stipulation thus is not evidence of the number of 
acres grazed. 
Although raised by the Tax Commission and Mayflower, the 
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Commission's use of the stipulation is not critical. Even if the 
stipulated acres for the South Mountains is included in the Tax 
Commission's computation, Mayflower does not satisfy the AUM 
requirements. County's Opening Brief at 41. 
F. The Tax Commission's Computation Of AUMs Used Is Not 
Supported By Substantial Evidence. 
Once the AUM capacity of the grazed land is determined, the 
next step is to compute the AUMs used by Gillmor. AUMs used is 
determined by the grazing duration, animal type, and numbers of 
animals. The Tax Commission found the AUMs used were 1725 based 
on a hypothetical. The evidence however only supported a finding 
of 1590 AUMs. See County's Opening Brief at 42-43. 
In this appeal, the Tax Commission does not defend its finding 
by justifying the 1725 computation. Instead, it computes a range 
of AUMs usage suggested by the evidence. Tax Commission Brief at 
41-43. The high end of this range was based on very general, and 
somewhat unclear testimony of Gillmor on direct examination 
concerning the duration and number of cows grazed. The low end of 
the range was based on very specific testimony on cross 
examination. Based on these range of AUMs used, the Tax Commission 
concludes its 1725 computation was supported by the record. 
The Tax Commission conclusion is based on a misunderstanding 
of the substantial evidence standard. Under this standard, the 
Court considers evidence on both sides of the issue and only 
affirms the agency's decision if the "quantum and quality of the 
relevant evidence . . . is adequate to convince a reasonable mind 
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to support the conclusion," Utah Association of Counties v. Tax 
Commission, 895 P.2d 819, 812 (Utah 1995). 
Considering the evidence on both sides of this issue, a 
reasonable mind would not be convinced by the general testimony 
cited by the Tax Commission but would rather be convinced by the 
specific information elicited on cross examination. The Tax 
Commission's findings on AUM usage is therefore not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 
G. The Tax Commission's Finding of Compliance With The Act's 
Production Requirements Is Not Supported By Adequate 
Subsidiary Findings. 
As shown above and discussed in the County's Opening Brief at 
47-48, the Tax Commission's finding of compliance with the Act's 
production requirements is not supported by adequate subsidiary 
findings. It is simply not possible to tell how the Tax Commission 
arrived at its computation of the acreage grazed. Similarly, it 
is not possible to understand the basis for its computation of AUMs 
used, especially why it rejected Gillmor's specific testimony 
concerning the duration of grazing. 
Subsidiary findings are particularly appropriate in this case 
where the Commission admittedly misunderstood the evidence in the 
its original Decision. The process of articulating subsidiary 
findings is critical to a reasoned decision making process and to 
appellate review of an agency's decision.6 In light of appellees' 
6
 In Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 6-7 (Utah App. 
1991), this Court described the importance of the process of 
stating the basis for an agency's decision: 
The findings are an integral part of the 
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inability to articulate the Tax Commission's reasoning, the Court 
should find the Tax Commission findings are inadequate. 
H. Gillmor's Testimony Does Not Establish Compliance With 
the Post-1993 Production Requirements. 
The Tax Commission's finding of compliance with the Act's 
production requirements is based solely on its computation of AUM 
capacity and AUM usage. Decision at p. 11-12. Mayflower however 
suggests that Gillmor's testimony fulfilled its burden of proving 
compliance with the post-1993 production requirements. Mayflower 
Brief at 15. Interestingly, the Tax Commission, for the first time 
in this appeal, suggests that it own decision below should be 
sustained based on Gillmor's testimony. Tax Commission Brief at 45. 
Gillmor's testimony however cannot be used to correct the errors 
in the Tax Commission's computation of AUMs. 
Contrary to appellees' suggestion, the Gillmor testimony does 
not evidence compliance with the production requirements for all 
Mayflower's property. Gillmor's testimony concerning capacity and 
logical process a tribunal must go through in 
reaching a decision. . . Once an administrative 
agency attempts to state its findings, identify 
the applicable law, and articulate its logic, 
it may discover that critical facts are not 
properly before it, that the law is other than 
anticipated, or that its initial logic is 
flawed. In such situations, a result contrary 
to the initial conclusions of the body may be 
dictated. The process of articulation clearly 
enhances the agency self-discipline and 
protects against arbitrary and capricious 
decisions. Without the safeguard of adequate 
findings, there is no guarantee that the agency 
followed a logical process in reaching its 
decision. 
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production focused on the different areas found on Exhibit 2, copy 
of which is attached to this brief. 
First, Gillmor testified concerning his usage of the Mayflower 
property excluding the South Mountains. This property was in white 
on the map. With respect to this area, he testified to using a 
substantial portion of the property's capacity. (Tr./Gillmor p. 40 
1. 3-18) 
Second, Gillmor testified concerning the blue shaded area, the 
South Mountains. He stated that the land itself had not changed 
in this area and grew the same amount of feed. He however stated 
that the land could not be grazed because of the encroachment of 
civilization. (Tr./Gillmor p. 41-42). 
As can be seen from the record, Gillmor did not testify to 
using half the capacity of all Mayflower property including the 
South Mountains. The South Mountains had the demonstrated capacity 
to sustain a large herd for a whole grazing season. This capacity 
continued to exist. Gillmor simply did not use this capacity 
because of the dogs and other activity in and around the area. 
Thus, Gillmorfs testimony establishes that he did not use half of 
the capacity of the South Mountains. 
Even if Gillmor's testimony arguably supported Mayflower's 
position, it could not provide the basis for affirming the Tax 
Commission's findings. The Tax Commission's finding of compliance 
with the production requirements was based on an AUM computation, 
not Gillmor's testimony about capacity and usage. It is not the 
Court's role to make findings using Gillmor's testimony. See 
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generally Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025 (Utah App. 1991). 
III. MAYFLOWER IS LIABLE FOR THE ROLLBACK TAX BECAUSE OF AN ABSENCE 
OF AGRICULTURAL USE ON THE SOUTH MOUNTAINS. 
Under § 59-2-506, the absence of agricultural use on the South 
Mountains triggers the roll-back tax. Mayflower however claims 
that the County has waived its right to roll back tax by relying 
only on the "post 1992 test." Mayflower Brief at p. 2-3. This 
assertion is nonsense. The County Opening Brief did not rely only 
on the post-1993 statute to show the absence of agriculture use in 
the South Mountains. Countyys Opening Brief at 24-25 (citing to 
the Utah Constitution, the pre-1993 Act, and the post-1993 Act). 
The Court should therefore disregard Mayflower's waiver claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The uncontroverted facts establish that beginning in 
approximately 1989, Gillmor stopped herding sheep into the South 
Mountains and affirmatively tried to keep them out of that area. 
Thereafter, whenever animals would wander into the South Mountains, 
Gillmor would quickly retrieve them. Based on these facts, the 
Court should reverse the Tax Commission finding that agricultural 
use existed on the South Mountain and enter judgment for the County 
imposing the roll back tax. 
If the South Mountains are deemed to be actively devoted to 
an agricultural purpose, then Mayflower has failed to prove 
compliance with the production requirements of the post-1993 
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Farmland Assessment Act. In this event, the County is entitled to 
a judgment removing all of Mayflower's property from greenbelt. 
DATED this 18th day of November, 1996. 
^^^OSEP^TT'DU^BECK, JR. 
Attorney for Board of Equalizatic 
Wasatch County 
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ADDENDUM 

